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After long, wide trends toward freer and more integrated markets, peo-
ples and ideas, reluctance to subordinate the ideals of globalization
to state interests shows signs of serious erosion. Recent examples in-
clude the breakdown of international institutions, the rise in state con-
trol over energy resources and their use as diplomatic leverage, and us
abandonment of the principles of globalization. The sources of these
changing preferences are both ideological and utilitarian. The result is
that key elements of globalization are at risk, but with unpredictable
consequences.
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Introduction
At the end of the 20th century, the great debate between socialism and
capitalism was judged largely to have been resolved in favor of mar-
kets, free trade and entrepreneurs over central planning, protectionism
and state-led roles. The confluence of these ‘victories’ with the spread
of democracy and great technological advances yielded a multi-faceted
globalization of commerce, culture and even ‘the end of history’. Liber-
alism seemed to have gone global, overtaking competing -isms in theory
and in practice.
In the 1980s and 1990s, democratic and market reforms spread across
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Africa and Asia. Great leaps
in telecommunications increasingly connected these regions with the
West and the rest of the world. Multilateral tariﬀ negotiations expanded
into a global organization of more than 150 countries bound to rules on
goods, services, intellectual property, and dispute settlement. A détente-
era forum for East-West issues became a 56-member organization to pro-
mote democratic, electoral, economic and human rights reform ‘from
Vancouver to Vladivostok’.¹ Between 1988 and 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize
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was awarded to eight organizations (including the United Nations) for
worldwide humanitarian, nonproliferation, development and environ-
mental eﬀorts.
Rapidly, however, the promise of global peace and prosperity became
challenged by terrorism, energy insecurity, faltering democratic move-
ments and more. In this context, states and populations have more easily
overlooked the open and cooperative ideals. Notable developments in-
clude the breakdown of international institutions, the rise of state con-
trol and diplomatic use of energy resources, and the us shift in priorities
away from the basic ideals of globalization.
Alone, any of these might represent a normal ‘blip’ in international
politics and economics. But considering new global economic and se-
curity concerns, emerging evidence of retreat from democracy in some
countries (and continued lack of democratic development in others),
and a rise in leaders’ use of nationalism and populism to appeal to dis-
quieted electorates, together they may augur an important and troubling
trend. They may suggest political, economic and cultural indicators of
a return to the centrality of states, and the willingness of governments
and populations to put their state interests and identities first. A general
acceptance of democracy and markets remains, but reluctance to subor-
dinate those ideals to state interest shows signs of serious erosion. The
question is whether all this amounts merely to a cacophony of cries from
insecure workers, voters and leaders, or to an inchoate orchestral move-
ment away from global liberalism. This article serves in part as a call for
investigations, qualitative and quantitative alike, into these trends. Such
inquiry would serve scholarly, policy and commercial interests.
First, this article highlights some of the classic and emerging literature
on the changing nature of states and the state system during globaliza-
tion. Second, it considers evidence of three potential trends: the break-
down of international institutions, the rise of state control and diplo-
matic use of energy resources, and the abandonment of the principles of
globalization by the United States. Next, it evaluates two sources of these
changes in preferences by states and societies: ideological shift and prag-
matism. Finally, the article oﬀers avenues of inquiry for further investi-
gation, in search of corroborating or contradictory evidence and more
informed scholarship and policy-making.
One caveat. The goal of the article is neither to mourn nor celebrate a
possible decline of globalization. Some people focus on the economic,
cultural and other costs of globalization – a rich and important area
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of study. But this analysis examines threats to generally beneficial as-
pects of globalization such as the expansion of democracy and human
rights, greater international cooperation, and the benefits of integrated
and market-oriented economies. The purpose here is to recognize ongo-
ing changes, to understand the sources of such changes, and to be aware
of their implications. In these ways, policy makers, scholars, business and
citizens can prepare for, ameliorate or even benefit from the eﬀects of
such changes.
Challenges to States and the International System
The shift away from the generations-old movement of freer and more
integrated markets, people and ideas, and from the acceleration and in-
tensification of it known as globalization, takes place within a context
of a longer discussion of the challenges to the primacy of states and of
competing descriptions of the global system.
Among the seminal ideas on the decline of the pre-eminence of
the state is Keohane and Nye’s (1977) ‘complex interdependence’, in
which states were joined by non-state actors as legitimate contenders for
power and influence in the international system. Albert Bressand (1983)
warned of threats to the ‘worldeconomy’ [sic] even before globalization
bloomed. Later, Susan Strange (1995) explored the expanded role of non-
state actors in the global economy, including organized crime, multina-
tional corporations and inter-governmental organizations. Moses Naim
(2005) judged that the proliferation of micropowers – like bloggers,
hedge funds, human traﬃckers (and suicide terrorists (Pape 2006)) –
created a hyper-polar system.
The development of states themselves also came under increasing
scrutiny. In an era widely perceived as a global ‘wave’ of democratization
(Huntington 1991), the reality was more complex. Terry Lynn Karl (1995)
identified ‘hybrid regimes’ that combined authoritarian and democratic
practices. Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) observed diﬃculties in ‘consoli-
dating’ new regimes as democratic. Larry Diamond (2000) warned of a
‘reverse wave’, signaling the end and ebb of the current era of democra-
tization. Robert Rothberg (2003) and others drew attention to failed and
failing states, while James Dobbins (2007; 2008) and others detailed the
diﬃculties of nation-building.
States and other actors also faced a changing operational environ-
ment. Jessica Mathews (1997) discussed the shift of powers from the state
to supra-, sub- and non-state actors. Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997) de-
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scribed states as transferring some of their regulating duties to transgov-
ernmental organizations. Joseph Stiglitz (2002) acknowledged some of
the shortcomings of international institutions, while David Held (2004)
oﬀered a social democratic alternative to the markets-first globalization.
Jorg Friedrichs (2001) and John Rapley (2006) oﬀered a ‘new medieval-
ism’ in which overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties are stronger
than states. Henry Kissinger (2001) was critical of those seeking with-
out due care to replace Westphalia’s sovereignty and non-interference
with humanitarian intervention and universal jurisdiction. Peregrine
Worsthorne (1991) and Hubert Vedrine (1998) called the us a ‘hyper-
power’. But Andrew Bacevich (2005a; 2005b), Chalmers Johnson (2004;
2006) and others warned of the consequences of American empire, while
Thomas Friedman (2005) and Fareed Zakaria (2008) described a ‘flat’,
‘post-American’ world. More broadly, Niall Ferguson (2005) noted an
emerging resemblance to the global conditions that contributed toWorld
War I, reminiscent of Norman Angell’s (1909) warnings from that earlier
era of globalization.
The international system was indeed evolving – ‘global’ was neces-
sary to replace ‘international’ to reflect the rising role of non-state ac-
tors. But states and state interests did not disappear. It was national elec-
torates that defeated eu restructurings. Governments defending national
interests stalled trade negotiations, and responded with ‘unprecedented
measures’ (Paulson 2008) to the financial crisis in 2008. It was national
governments that increasingly took state control over energy sectors and
used those resources in aggressive diplomacy. And it was us government
policy, with broad popular support (at least for a while) which shifted
from post-Cold War idealism to realism and from focusing on the bene-
fits of globalization to focusing on its risks. The question is not whether
strong states and globalization can co-exist, but whether state and soci-
etal tendencies are increasingly parochial or integrating. The changing
preferences of states and societies is away from the principles of global-
ization.
The Changing Preferences of States and Societies
The postwar progress toward freer markets, people and ideas, which ac-
celerated and globalized after the end of the Cold War, has come un-
der increasing pressure. This can be illustrated by looking at three evolv-
ing trends: breakdowns in international institutions, increased state con-
trol and diplomatic use of energy resources, and considerable retraction
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from globalization ideals by its prime mover and struggling hegemon.
breakdown of international institutions
Key international organizations of the post-World War ii era faced
abrupt decelerations in the post-post-Cold War era. First, the proposed
restructuring of the European Union stalled after being rejected by pop-
ular referendums in spring 2005 and summer 2008. Second, the Doha
Development Round of the World Trade Organization talks broke down
in June 2006, with little prospect for recovery. Third, the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (imf) confronted a range of emerging
challenges and criticism. Finally, the 2008 global financial crisis tested
the world’s leading economies, with governments responding in ways
fundamentally opposite of market-based solutions.
Shaping the Future of Europe
The European Union (eu) traces its origins to postwar European eﬀorts
at economic reconstruction and political cooperation. After the Cold
War, the pace of ‘widening’ (moremember states) and ‘deepening’ (more
integration) accelerated. It added Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995,
ten more states (several formerly of the Soviet bloc) in 2004, and Bul-
garia and Romania in 2007. The areas of eu governance expanded from
economic and trade topics to social, justice and foreign policy areas and
the establishment of a common currency.
To manage the larger number of members and issues, a treaty estab-
lishing a constitution for Europe was developed. But in May and June
2005, popular referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected the
new constitution, and polls indicated that voters in the United Kingdom
and Poland might do the same. In France and the Netherlands, the main
political parties supported ratification (as did uk prime minister, Tony
Blair), but substantial elements across the population (55 and 61 percent,
respectively) did not.² Of the 15 nations that ratified, only Spain (before
France and the Netherlands) and Luxembourg (after) did so by referen-
dum.
Support for ‘no’ to the constitution was found on both the political
left and right. Issues ranged from concerns over the economy to dissat-
isfaction with the political parties, but also anti-immigration fervor, a
‘general crisis in French society’, and a sense of distance from the institu-
tion(s) of the eu itself.³ (For context, the Maastricht treaty of 1992 also
had early diﬃculties. Denmark and the uk eventually got special ‘opt
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out’ provisions.) Today, a new governing structure remains necessary to
manage 27 members of diverse geographic, economic, cultural and eth-
nic backgrounds and interests, including the debate over whether to ad-
mit Turkey.
In the wake of the failed constitution, eu members’ leaders agreed to
the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007, with the goal of ratification by
all 27 member states by the end of 2008. All national governments ex-
cept Ireland put the decision-making in the hands of their parliaments.
The Irish, entitled to a referendum by their own constitution, rejected
the treaty in June 2008. As in France and the Netherlands, most of Ire-
land’s political, business and labor leadership supported the treaty, but
for a wide range of reasons (including insuﬃcient understanding and
protecting Irish identity), the majority of voters did not.⁴
This is not to suggest that eu integration was the same as globaliza-
tion, or necessary for it. Rather, the ideas driving eu integration were
dominant elsewhere during the era of globalization, while the questions
facing the eu now are contemporary with and related to broader ques-
tions of global integration.
wto-Doha
Like the eu, the World Trade Organization (wto) has roots in the post-
war era. Twenty-three countries founded an international trade regime
January 1, 1948, the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (gatt).
gatt rounds over the next four decades removed a wide range of tar-
iﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers and introduced a general principle of ‘most-
favored nation’ status among the treaty’s increasing number of signato-
ries. By 1986, 125 countries began the Uruguay Round, which sought to
develop gatt into a permanent institution, the wto, which was estab-
lished in 1995.⁵
Subsequent eﬀorts at expanding the trade regime have been diﬃcult.⁶
The ‘Seattle Round’ was scuttled in the face of anti-globalization protests
in 1999. wto members tried again at a more secure location, Doha,
Qatar, in 2001. It was to focus on development, not just trade facilita-
tion. The diﬃculties of the Doha Round took shape by the time of the
Cancun meeting in 2003. A group of developing nations (dubbed the
g-20, with approximately that number of member states) contested us
and eu agricultural policies on subsidies and market access, while de-
veloping nations were resistant to further opening of their markets to
rich-country manufactured goods. When talks in Geneva broke down
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in July 2006, many observers considered the Doha Round to be unsal-
vageable, since us law permitting ‘fast-track’ consideration of any trade
bill (that is, without Congressional amendments) was set to expire, and
did, in June 2007. Doha Round negotiations were restarted in Potsdam
in 2007 and Geneva in 2008, but collapsed each time on the agricultural
and market-access details.
World Bank and imf
The principle international financial institutions are also under increas-
ing pressure. The eﬀorts of the World Bank and imf came under a
range of criticisms, including by at least two Nobel economists (Krug-
man 1999; Stiglitz 2002; 2006; Easterly 2001; 2006; Collier 2007). The imf
also strained under internal, conceptual questions. Its post-1989 ‘Wash-
ington Consensus’ reform package was criticized as ‘neo-liberal’, blamed
for financial crises and judged generally harmful to implementing coun-
tries. It was finally abandoned by its originators as the ‘stale ideological
rhetoric of the 1990s’ (Williamson 2003).⁷ TheWorld Bank and imf were
also distracted when the controversial World Bank president Paul Wol-
fowitz (in 2007) and imf managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn
(in 2008) faced personal personnel scandals.
The World Bank and imf also faced new competition. Facing enor-
mous demand for energy and other natural resources, China increasingly
uses the vast resources of its government-owned China Development
Bank to make loans to developing countries, to secure access for Chinese
companies to the borrowers’ natural resources.⁸ China makes these and
other deals without the human rights, social and environmental condi-
tions imposed by the imf and World Bank (imf and World Bank 2006).
During the 2008 financial crisis, the entire postwar structure was ques-
tioned. imf’s Dominique Strauss-Kahn acknowledged that, ‘It is neces-
sary to review the functioning of the architecture of the global finan-
cial system.’⁹ British prime minister Gordon Brown and French Presi-
dent Nicholas Sarkozy were among those who called for a ‘new Bret-
ton Woods [. . .] to rebuild our fractured international financial system’
(Brown 2008).
Wall Street
From 2007 through 2008, the bursting of the American housing bub-
ble, the implications for the highly leveraged mortgage-related financial
instruments and the subsequent credit crisis among major investment
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banks developed into a global financial crisis. Stock markets plummeted
in Russia, Europe, North America and East Asia, with fears of a long re-
cession. The responses to the crisis revealed at least two things: strong,
activist governments and dramatic changes in policy assumptions.
First, the response to the crisis demonstrated that free-market, demo-
cratic governments in the most advanced economies could be strong,
willing actors in an eﬀort to prevent a crisis from becoming a catastro-
phe. us Treasury Secretary Paulson – dubbed ‘King Henry’ – was the key
figure in the government’s series of steps that included vast increases in
authority for the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank. Through Oc-
tober 2008, these included arranging the sale, bailout, failure, or restruc-
turing of the major investment banks; supporting the federal takeover of
the giant us firms of the secondary mortgage market; temporarily ban-
ning short-selling; increasing the size and scope of the federal guarantee
on bank deposits; orchestrating the government’s right to purchase up to
$700 billion of distressed assets; and issuing a plan to partially national-
ize a number of us banks, with the Treasury purchasing $250 billion in
shares and imposing new restrictions (Cho, Irwin, andWhoriskey 2008).
Purchasing shares in insurers soon followed.
European banks were similarly engaged with plans that came to in-
clude loan and deposits guarantees and governments’ direct purchase of
bank shares. But some considered cooperation among the major coun-
tries to be slow in coming: ‘Germany shattered any semblance of Euro-
pean unity on the global credit crisis last night’ (Boyes 2008) read one re-
port, after an unsuccessful Paris summit and unilateral eﬀorts by Greece,
Ireland, Denmark. As Iceland’s banking system neared collapse, and fail-
ing to gather support from its Western allies, the prime minister com-
plained that it was ‘every country for itself ’, and turned to Russia for a
loan (Mason 2008).
Second, the response to the crisis demonstrated a fundamental change
among the governments of wealthy countries. Over the last three decades,
these countries generally had switched from mid-century Keynesian-
fdr interventionist policies toward Hayek-Thatcher-Reagan market-led
policies. Politicians, scholars and the media all made headlines, such as
‘Necessity pushes out principles’ (Beattie 2008), ‘Undertakers deliver last
rites for us capitalism’ (Guha 2008) and ‘We’re all socialists now.’¹⁰ The
American electorate slowed down Congressional approval of the original
$700 billion plan – at least partly on ideological grounds – but seemed to
concede in the face of rapidly declining retirement accounts and count-
less media references to the Great Depression. Secretary Paulson (2008)
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acknowledged that, ‘Government owning a stake in any private us com-
pany is objectionable to most Americans, me included.’ Plans to nation-
alize private pension funds, as announced in Argentina, were received by
prominent Democrats in Congress.¹¹As Paul Krugman pointed out early
in the crisis, ‘Much of Washington appears to have decided that govern-
ment isn’t the problem, it’s the solution.’ (Krugman 2008.) Even Alan
Greenspan (2008) confessed that in his trust in markets over regulation,
‘I made a mistake.’
Whether this change is temporary or long-term remains to be seen.
But if government eﬀorts at saving the markets are perceived to fail, both
the government and the markets will be criticized. If the interventions
are perceived to work, markets may still be seen as a problem, and gov-
ernment as a solution.
The problems of the eu, wto, imf and World Bank, and the Western
financial sector are important for at least two reasons. First, they identify
that populations and governments in both the developed and developing
regions have large concerns over the future direction and extent of mar-
kets and integration. Second, they mark significant pauses – or perhaps
breaks – in a general trends in the West since the end of World War ii
and globally since the end of the Cold War.
The breakdown of international institutions also may mark potential
inroads for certain rising powers whose strengths lie in Western reliance
on imported energy and whose commitments are not to democratic, hu-
man rights or market-oriented globalization. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
Iran’s supreme leader, claimed that the Marxist and capitalist models
have failed, proving the Islamic model’s superiority.¹² Venezuela’s social-
ist president, Hugo Chavez, noted that in the face of crisis theWest aban-
doned its free-markets model in favor of socialist policies.¹³
energy: state control and diplomatic leverage
Energy-exporting countries have begun to reassert the role of the state
in their energy sectors, and are increasingly using their natural resources
for diplomatic leverage. Concern about ‘resource nationalism’ in states
like Russia, Iran and Venezuela is based on emerging diplomatic trends,
including relations among these non-democratic energy exporters, and
deteriorating relations between energy exporters and importers.
Russia
Russia headlines a discussion on energy diplomacy. It temporarily halted
gas supply to Ukraine in 2006, reduced oil supplies to the Czech Repub-
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lic after a 2008 us-Czech deal on antiballistic missile systems, and had
extended and ultimately hostile disagreements with Georgia. Europe be-
came increasingly worried about its own reliance on Russian energy.
Russia continues to enlarge state control over the energy sector, in-
cluding the state takeovers of Yukos (beginning in 2003) and Sibneft
(2005). By 2006, a new tactic emerged: Russian oﬃcials threatened for-
eign oil and gas investors in the name of environmentalism. The Shell
(with partners Mitsui and Mitsubishi) oil and gas project, Sakhalin-2,
and the Russo-Anglo tnk-bp deal in Siberia each became targets, with
state-owned Gazprom as the beneficiary. In 2007, the French oil company
Total was limited to a minority stake in a partnership with Gazprom for
Arctic development.¹⁴
More generally, Russia’s relations with the West cooled. In 2006, it re-
ceived a scolding on energy and democracy from us vice president Dick
Cheney in Vilnius, was again denied membership in the wto, and made
deals to provide arms to the anti-American regime in Venezuela. An
eu pipeline deal with Kazakhstan avoiding Russian territory was com-
pleted, and questions were raised over Russia-Algeria cooperation over
gas supplies to Europe. An oecd report (2006) criticized the expansion
of Gazprom and Russian policies. In July 2007 Putin announced a mora-
torium on Russia’s compliance with the 1990 Conventional Forces in Eu-
rope (cfe) treaty. In August 2007, Russia planted a flag on the Arctic
seabed near the North Pole, symbolically claiming its potential resources.
Russia has also begun strengthening ties with China and Central Asia in
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a nascent military and/or en-
ergy alliance (Gat 2007). The war in Georgia in August 2008, and Rus-
sian recognition of independence for two Georgian regions, marked a
new post-Cold War low point. Late in 2008, Russia and Iran (and Qatar)
discussed creating a natural gas cartel. Advice from a former prime min-
ister of Ukraine was foreboding: the West must ‘counter Russia’s long-
standing expansionism and its present desire to recapture its great-power
status at the expense of its neighbors’ (Tymoshenko 2007).
Iran
Iran has the world’s second largest reserves of oil and of gas, already dom-
inated by the state. The government relies heavily on its state-owned en-
ergy sector: oil provides 85 percent of the government’s revenues.¹⁵ De-
spite higher global energy prices, Iran continued to struggle domestically
with inflation, unemployment and production capacity limits, and in
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July 2007 imposed gasoline rations on its citizens.¹⁶ Nevertheless, higher
global energy prices have enabled Iran to assert a more aggressive foreign
policy.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has attracted considerable
negative attention for his Holocaust denials and threats to the existence
of Israel. But concerns over Iran’s foreign policies are also more funda-
mental, rooted in the dominance of Ali Khamenei, supreme leader since
1989 (Ganji 2008). His Iran has a two-pronged foreign policy of con-
cern. First is ordinary regional contests: its support of Hamas, Hezbollah
and certain Shiite militias in Iraq, pursuing its interests against Israel, the
United States and Shia-Sunni cooperation in Iraq.
Second is the dispute over Iran’s nuclear power program, and its al-
leged pursuit of nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran could endanger Israel
and its neighbors, and cause a regional arms race. If the international
community were to increase sanctions for nuclear non-compliance,
Iran might temporarily limit oil exports, or complicate passage of ships
through the Straits of Hormuz,¹⁷ resulting in a global price spike without
resolving the issue. If the us or Israel were to attack suspected nuclear
technology sites in Iran, any of a number of options might develop,
from civil unrest to regional war – all threatening global oil supplies.
Russia’s military ties with Iran, its assistance with the development of
Iran’s civilian nuclear power, reports of a Russian scientist providing nu-
clear weapons assistance, and mutual interest in countering American
strength in the region raise questions about their nuclear relationship
(Scolino 2008).
Venezuela
Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez attempts to be a connection be-
tween these various energy issues and new allies. Energy provided over
90 percent of export revenues and more than half of the government’s
revenues.¹⁸ Despite domestic electricity problems,¹⁹ the increases in rev-
enue from sharp oil price increases had a directly emboldening eﬀect
on Venezuelan foreign policy. In a 2006 world tour, Chavez secured an
arms deal with Russia, warned against us military action in Iran and
sought Iranian investment, praised Castro beside his hospital bed, en-
tered the Mercosur trade pact, secured China as an oil market and in-
vestor, and cultivated allies in Africa, Syria, Belarus and elsewhere on
energy or anti-American issues. Military purchases included Russian
attack helicopters, fighters and submarines, Belarussian air defense sys-
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tems, and Chinese jet trainers. After winning re-election in December
2006, Chavez announced the closing of rctv television channel, gained
authority from the National Assembly to rule by decree, moved to na-
tionalize the telecommunications, electricity, gold and energy sectors (at
considerable expense to foreign firms), and pledged to leave the imf
and World Bank. Chavez seeks a leadership role and increased coop-
eration among Latin American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia,
Columbia, Ecuador and Uruguay.
These countries in turn followed Venezuela’s example in reasserting
state control over private assets. Argentina claimed to be defending its
natural resources when it announced plans to expropriate large foreign-
owned tracts of land, despite the owners’ claims that they themselves
are protecting the land as environmental philanthropists (Mander 2006).
Bolivia’s new populist leader and Chavez ally, Evo Morales, made claims
on foreign companies’ natural gas production. Ecuador nationalized the
assets of us-based Occidental Petroleum. Mexico, meanwhile, contin-
ued to prohibit foreign investment in its national oil company, Pemex. A
lack of energy infrastructure improvements risks the future of Mexico’s
largest source of income and the us’s second-largest oil supplier. ²⁰
Together, these major energy-supplying countries (and some minor
ones) are committed to interests other than full participation in a global
economy, accepting certain costs or even dangers in exchange for short-
term interests of the regime. But at the same time, the 800-pound global-
ization gorilla also began acting in some nationalist, protectionist ways.
united states: abandoning globalization?
The Cold War victory fueled an American surge of faith in democratic
values, and expanded confidence in those values as universal. In the
1980s, the American leadership shifted from containing communism to
defeating it, intent on spreading the political, economic and security
benefits it expected would follow (Reagan 1984; 1987; Bush 1989; 1992).
In the ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer 1990/1991) after the Soviet col-
lapse, the us saw an opportunity to promote global leadership. The Clin-
ton administration often (albeit not exclusively nor perfectly) sought
to exercise this global leadership multilaterally, focused on democratic
values and institutions, market-oriented economies and human rights.
Democracy promotion was in part pragmatic, with bipartisan belief in
the practical wisdom of expanding the ‘democratic peace’ (Baker 1992;
Christopher 1993) and in blending realism and idealism (Krautham-
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mer 1990/1991; Brzezinski 1997; Clinton 2000). More importantly, it el-
evated American idealism as a foreign policy tool and goal – a mis-
understood version of ‘the end of history’ and a globalized sense of
‘shining city on a hill’. The us military was employed in peacekeeping
and nation-building in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere.
The democracy-promoting osce expanded to reach ‘from Vancouver
to Vladivostok’. Free trade and greater integration was promoted with
the development of nafta and the wto; similar agendas were advanced
in the eu, asean and Mercosur. The virtues of democracy, privatiza-
tion and the freer flow of goods and capital were promoted to post-
Communist transitioning countries, Latin America, East Asia and imf
borrowers.
Policy changes from the Cold War worldview were implemented at
the administrative level as well. The us diplomatic corps made sev-
eral changes reflecting and directing the nature of globalization (Talbott
1997). The Foreign Service Institute required a new course on transna-
tional issues like narcotics traﬃcking and refugee flows. Many more
us government employees from departments of Justice, Transporta-
tion, Treasury and Health and Human Services were staﬃng embassies,
and working with multinational and non-governmental groups, not just
bilateral relations. In postwar Bosnia, for example, ‘nine agencies and
departments of the us government are cooperating with more than a
dozen other governments, seven international organizations, and 13 ma-
jor ngos – from the Red Cross to the International Crisis Group to the
American Bar Association – to implement the Dayton Peace Accords.’²¹
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, fueled at least two dra-
matic developments in us policy and sentiment away from these trends
in globalization. The first was a reversion from idealism and multilater-
alism to realism and unilateralism, accelerating a trend that began even
before the attacks. The second was a shift from emphasizing the benefits
of globalization to focusing on its dangers. It manifested this shift with
a more militarized foreign policy, rising nationalism, economic protec-
tionism, and a state-led response to the 2008 financial crisis.
Return to Realism
us reversion to realism and unilateralism predated the 2001 attacks
themselves. William Safire (1999a; 1999b) described this in the New York
Times early in the nomination process, and Condoleezza Rice (2000) was
an unabashed realist when she was Candidate Bush’s key foreign policy
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advisor. In the first months of the George W. Bush administration, the
us abandoned the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, the environmental
approaches outlined in the Kyoto Protocol, and a standing international
war crimes tribunal.
After the terror attacks, the obvious state-level action was the dislodge-
ment of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In October 2001, 89 per-
cent of Americans approved of President Bush’s handling of the situation
– and 81 percent supported an attack on Saddam Hussein.²² The White
House and the American people had shifted from globally-interested,
post-Westphalian humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping to self-
preserving regime change and pre-emptive war.
Militarizing Foreign Policy
Changes in language and perspective reinforced the new attention tomil-
itary problems and solutions.²³ Terrorism was no longer considered a
law enforcement problem, but an act of war. President Bush declared a
‘global war on terror’, targeted al Qaeda as following ‘in the path of fas-
cism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism’,²⁴ and warned of Iran, Iraq and
North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’. ²⁵ In a strange combination of themes
from former us Presidents Wilson, Truman, Reagan and Clinton, Iraq
was targeted not only for possible weapons of mass destruction, but also
as the cornerstone for democratic change in the Middle East. From Can-
didate Bush, who opposed nation-building, evolved the president of pre-
emption, regime change, and coercive democratization. Rice was judged
to have evolved in this same direction (Kessler 2007).
These changes were formalized in the 2002National Security Strategy.²⁶
Its themes included ‘preserve, defend and extend the peace’ and justify-
ing pre-emption as part of the war on terror. These echoed themes of
the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance – unipolarity, unilateralism, pre-
emption – drafted by persons who became top Bush administration
oﬃcials in 2001.²⁷ America’s ‘gravest danger’, warned the 2002 nss, is the
‘global reach’ of terrorists at the ‘crossroads of radicalism and technol-
ogy’. The theme continued in the 2006 National Security Strategy, with
reference to illicit arms and wmd trade: ‘Globalization has exposed us to
new challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests
and values.’²⁸
Nationalism
In addition to Bush’s more assertive military posture, questions combin-
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ing cultural exceptionalism, national security and economic protection-
ism emerged on two fronts: a new East-West debate (between Islam and
the (Christian or secular) West), and a battle over immigration.
The first was related directly to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Bush
acknowledged that Americans were asking themselves, Why do they hate
us?, and oﬀered his answer: ‘They hate our freedoms – our freedom
of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble
and disagree with each other.’²⁹ A variety of eﬀorts to answer this ques-
tion were undertaken in the subsequent years, with results ranging from
Bush’s presumably careless use of the word ‘crusade’ and a commitment
to changing the political culture and structure of the Middle East, to a
myriad of new university, think-tank, ngo, television and other ‘under-
standing Islam’ and ‘Islam and the West’ programs.
If Americans struggled with comprehending this ‘clash of civilizations’
(Huntington 1993), they knew an older one – immigration – very well.
During the second Bush administration, the American public increas-
ingly clamored for stricter immigration enforcement.³⁰ Polls from early
2005 through mid-2006 consistently showed that 77 percent of respon-
dents said the us was ‘not doing enough to keep illegal immigrants out
of the country’. Polls in 2006 and 2007 found support for using the Na-
tional Guard and ‘building a fence’ to help secure the southern us border
against illegal immigrants exceeded 60 percent. Seventy percent believed
that illegal immigrants weaken the economy, while nearly 90 percent
thought the problems of illegal immigration were ‘very serious’ (between
59 and 62 percent) or ‘serious’ (between 25 and 30 percent). In Europe,
polls also showed overwhelming support for stricter border control and
widespread views that illegal immigration was a problem.³¹
Reasons for these views varied. Some cited economic issues such as
taking American jobs and the costs to local governments for health care
and education.³² Some claimed a rule-of-law righteousness, arguing that
‘my grandparents/my spouse/I came legally’ and complaining about the
‘catch and release’ law enforcement. Cultural protectionists like Hunt-
ington (2004) questioned whether new immigrants had the appropriate
interest in and ability for ‘assimilation’. The national security-minded
warned against the ease with which terrorists could cross the border; this
last group often noted the vulnerability of our ports as well. These view-
points coalesced in response to President Bush’s 2007 immigration re-
form proposal, which was branded as ‘amnesty’ for providing a path to
citizenship for illegal immigrants.
Volume 6 · Number 4 · Winter 2008
356 James M. Quirk
Economic Protectionism
In some ways, security, cultural and economic dynamics were mutually
reinforcing. Unlike the usual topics of tariﬀs and subsidies monitored
by special interest groups, two cases of foreign direct investment became
topics of fierce public debate: the purchase of a us oil company by China,
and the transfer of several us port operations to the United Arab Emi-
rates.
In the summer of 2005, cnooc, an oil firm owned 70 percent by the
government of China, made a bid to purchase Unocal in the us. What
emerged was a ‘potent informal political alliance between pragmatic se-
curity hawks and the opponents of free trade’ (Hassett 2005). After con-
siderable pressure from its constituents, Congressional (but not White
House) opposition pressured cnooc to withdraw its bid, and Unocal
was acquired by Chevron, a us company.
In early 2006, us legislators again joined popular objection to an in-
ternational corporate deal. By purchasing a publicly-traded British com-
pany, the uae’s state-owned dp World would take over operations at
several us ports. Under public pressure, key leaders of both parties in
both houses of Congress worked to block the deal, while President Bush
publicly asked, ‘I don’t understand why it’s ok for a British company to
operate our ports but not a company from the Middle East.’³³ A deal
for dp World to sell its us port operations to American-owned aig
Global Investment Group was announced in December 2006. (Foreign
takeovers of ‘national security’ assets were also resisted even among fel-
low eu members. In 2006, France opposed a bid from metals giant Mit-
tal, headed by a London-based Indian, for Luxembourg-based Arcelor;
Italy opposed a takeover of its toll-road operator by a Spanish firm; and
Spain opposed the merger of Endesa by the German energy firm, E.On.)
2008 Financial Crisis
As described above, the responses to the 2008 financial crisis by us and
European governments were state-centric, with bailouts, arranged deals,
new financial guarantees, and the partial nationalization of banks or-
chestrated by self-empowering finance ministers, central bankers and
heads of state. This varied considerably from the imf prescriptions for
troubled economies in the 1990s, which usually called for fiscal responsi-
bility and market-oriented reforms. During the 1990s, Sweden and Japan
took critical actions, the us supported Mexico and Long-Term Capital
Management, and the imf supported a spiraling Russia. But the govern-
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ment roles in the 2008 crisis were historic in scope, dollar amount, and
philosophy.
It is noteworthy that in the us, the White House did not share the
opinion of many of its usual supporters on dp World and immigration;
the protectionism was led by constituents, especially among the pres-
ident’s conservative base. Elsewhere, the president generated criticism
for unilateralism and protectionism. Meanwhile, Democratic voters be-
came frustrated with their own Congressional leadership for failing to
deliver on pledges of troop withdrawals from Iraq. The judiciary was
not exempt: the public demanded state and local responses to a 2005
us Supreme Court decision expanding the government’s right to seize
private property for re-development.³⁴ A disconnect between govern-
ments and their publics is seen in Europe too: the governments typi-
cally supported the new governing treaties, but the French, Dutch and
Irish voters rejected them, and others might have. In the energy states,
though, the state (even if that means a particular ruler) has led the poli-
cies. Putin and Chavez are criticized as increasingly authoritarian, while
some see a swing to the populist, nationalist, or socialist left in Latin
America.³⁵
Academics, politicians and voters are not the only ones struggling to
understand these changes and conflicts. International business leaders,
long at the vanguard of globalization, ‘are being trapped by the un-
even landscape of sovereign protectionism’ and ‘national parochialism’
among mature democracies (Hamre 2007). That is, the diminishing re-
luctance to subordinate the principles of globalization to parochial inter-
ests comes from voters and regimes of diﬀerent political philosophies in
various parts of the world, aﬀecting people, governments and business.
The Sources of Changing Preferences
The changing preferences of states and societies that are manifesting
themselves as the breakdown of international institutions, the increased
politicization of oil and the wavering of us commitment to globalization
have at least two underlying sources. The first is philosophical – an ideo-
logical shift. The second is pragmatic, reflecting changing assessments of
the utility of existing policies and structures.
Philosophical Changes
The post-Cold War era, which lasted perhaps a decade, was filled with
hope, expectations and promises of idealism trumping realism. Human
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rights, free trade, a global democratic peace, and the end of history would
replace oppression, protectionism, nationalism, balance of power and
ideological struggles. The ideals of intervention in Bosnia, Cambodia,
East Timor, Eastern Slavonia, El Salvador, Haiti, Kosovo, Mozambique,
Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and elsewhere were to promote the hu-
man condition over and despite the political realities of the preceding
decades and centuries.
Even before September 11, 2001, though, the ideological return of re-
alism was underway. George W. Bush’s top foreign policy advisor (Rice
2000) promised a realist Weltanschauung. The administration’s promi-
nent neo-conservatives such asWolfowitz and Cheney sought to advance
American hegemony and self-interest, rather than any multilateral con-
fluence of global ideals. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the American
public gave wide latitude to the administration, at home and abroad, in
the interest of national security (Casey 2008; Giuora 2008). Support for
war against Afghanistan was nearly universal; a seemingly easy victory
there made expanding this militarization of foreign policy to Iraq easier.
This ideological position was joined by much of the American public in
fear of the ‘new normal’, and spread to opposition to previously obscure
foreign direct investment and immigration issues.
Putin and Chavez were likewise motivated by ideology, although in
some diﬀerent ways. Yeltsin’s handpicked successor did not focus on the
skillful repair and advancement of Russia’s broken democratic and mar-
ket ‘reforms’. Rather, Putin sought to meet Russians’ desperate hunger
for order, stability and a return of national prestige. The economic col-
lapse, the rise of the oligarchs, the struggle with Chechnya, the military’s
internal troubles, and the loss of super-power status – Putin was charged
with rectifying these, not strengthening civil society and human rights
law. Putin took on these challenges with his own personal and political
strength, enabled and emboldened by the growing price of oil.
Latin America became increasingly democratic in the 1980s and 1990s.
But in Chavez, Venezuela elected a former military coup leader commit-
ted to a Bolivarian social revolution, promoting social welfare, reining
in the private sector, and combating the prevailing international power
structure. Arguably, these views were not merely politically expedient but
sincere and long-held (Chavez 2005; Guevara 2005). Surviving a coup at-
tempt in 2002 and a recall vote in 2004, Chavez leveraged rising oil prices
into globalizing his Bolivarian agenda, combating international power
arrangements (particularly us hegemony), positioning himself as the ail-
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ing Fidel Castro’s philosophical heir, and asserting regional leadership
and a global role for Venezuela.
In Iran, the clerical/political leadership’s conservatism resisted prospec-
tive reforms under President Khatami. Bordered east and west by us mil-
itary occupation (and potentially democratizing regimes) in Afghanistan
and Iraq, Iran did not choose some fantastical democratization reform
of its own. Instead, it advanced policies to keep the elites in power and to
develop regional hegemony: persisting with its nuclear program, bom-
bast against Israel, and support of anti-Western Hamas, Hezbollah and
certain Iraqi Shiite factions. Meanwhile, Russia, Venezuela and Iran co-
operated in military, economic and diplomatic matters, in what the Lon-
don Times called the ‘axis of diesel’.³⁶
New Pragmatism
Understanding ideological trends in countries – returning to ‘normal’
or ‘historical’ patterns of state-centered, self-interested, power-seeking
realism rather than post-Westphalian, Kantian, liberal global idealism –
is an important but incomplete approach to recognizing the threats to
globalization. The trends in the United States, in the newly assertive oil
powers, and especially the breakdown of international institutions also
need to be understood within a more tangible context: pragmatic deci-
sions about utility.
Institutions are created andmaintained not merely for what they sym-
bolize, or what they are said to ‘mean’, but for mutual practical advan-
tage. The League of Nations had invaluable aims, but could not deliver;
the United Nations and its many agencies were created in its wake for
particular tasks. The postwar European Recovery Program was founded,
implemented and concluded. Interpol, opec, fifa and the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization had various founders for various reasons; each
evolves subject to the changing needs, perceptions and abilities of its
members. In the early 2000s, it is this same pragmatism about utility that
threatens several key international institutions – structures that were es-
tablished after World War ii, expanded after the Cold War and served as
foundations of globalization.
The ‘democratic deficit’, accountability, bureaucracy and other prob-
lems of the European Union have been well chronicled (Ross 1995;
Siedentop 2001; Lord 2004). But the ‘no’ votes in France, the Nether-
lands and Ireland were accumulations of particular concerns more than
larger philosophical debates. At the time of referendums, there were
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uncertain national economies, unpopular governments, and concerns
about proposed eu voting structures and Turkey. The Treaty of Lisbon
was signed with widespread practical acknowledgment of the need for
improvements to the eu’s decision-making processes, but without any
emotional surge of ‘Euro’-ness.
The postwar international financial institutions are also challenged by
practical matters. First is a question of value. With regional financial col-
lapses in Asia, Russia and Latin America in the last dozen years, and
the global crisis in 2008, external and internal evaluations detailed their
shortcomings. Second is a question of governance. The ifi’s decision-
making processes are dominated by the United States and a few other
countries. They are criticized for not reflecting changes to the global po-
litical economy since the 1940s. The World Bank began to recognize this,
putting forth in 2006 a ‘medium term strategy’ to change its governance,
surveillance and assistance policies (de Rato 2006). Third, and related
to value and governance, is the emergence of competition. States and
firms can turn to new bilateral sources of support, such as China and
sovereign wealth funds, for lending and development deals without the
usual ifi conditions and oversight. Private eﬀorts of Billanthropy (ne-
ologism from ‘Bill Gates’ and ‘Philanthropy’) or philanthrocapitalism³⁷
emerged partially in response to ifi shortcomings.
Like the eu and ifis, the World Trade Organization is struggling to
adapt to newmissions. The 50 years of lowering tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ bar-
riers has left only the most diﬃcult cases, such as services, intellectual
property rights and, especially, agriculture. Beyond questions of subsi-
dies and market access, agricultural issues include environmental pro-
tection, food security, and rural development. After a record of success
with industrial-age manufactured goods, the wto labors to manage pre-
and post-industrial issues.
Finally, pragmatism drove us and European governments to respond
to the 2008 financial crisis with new regulations, special ad hoc arrange-
ments, promises of very large financial relief, and discussion of over-
hauling the global financial system. These decisions were not made at
a graduate seminar on Smith and Ricardo or a social justice forum on
aﬀordable housing. They resulted from contentious, international, cross-
partisan eﬀorts to prevent dire circumstances from becoming catas-
trophic.
Utility is not entirely dissociated from philosophy, of course. Deciding
to reconsider long-held institutional arrangements, to take advantage of
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changing commodities prices, or to focus on new threats is not simply to
choose one ideological perspective over another. It is to make decisions
based on assessments and re-assessments of domestic and international
conditions. The risk is whether in the aggregate such re-assessments in-
cline states and other actors increasingly toward rivalry, threats and vio-
lence, or towards new possibilities for mutual benefit.
Looking Ahead: Possible Consequences
The significant instances of international institutional breakdown, hos-
tile state-controlled energy diplomacy, and trends away from globaliza-
tion call for various kinds of inquiry for the benefits of policy makers,
industry and citizens. Questions include the future of international or-
ganizations, the complex matrix of global energy politics, and the role of
the United States on the world stage.
International Institutions
International organizations have played important roles in advancing
cooperation since the end of World War ii and the end of the Cold
War. They serve as forums for grievance and negotiation, as coordinat-
ing regimes for functional utility, as sources of technical expertise and
assistance, and more. The question of whether they can mature to ad-
dress the needs of the 21st century remains to be seen. Not only is the
wto deadlocked on development issues, but also on membership: two
decades after Gorbachev’s reforms began, Armenia, Georgia and Latvia
(and China and Cuba) are members of the wto, but Russia is not. The
eu struggles with several new, large, and/or poorer members, the long-
standing question of Turkey, and formulating a new framework to ad-
dress its concerns. The imf and World Bank have new competition, less
‘liberalizing’ and ‘integrative’ in intent, while high-profile calls for debt
relief may well prove to be only a short-term solution without broader
development success. The reconstruction of global finance is an enor-
mous challenge: the initial g-20 meeting in Washington in November
2008 received mixed reviews.
According to Joseph Nye (2006), even nato’s future is at risk. It has
membership debates with Russia over its ‘near-abroad’, and internal de-
bate over special partnerships with Australia, Japan and others. nato
faces key questions over shaping its new mission, and it has mission dif-
ficulties in Afghanistan. That the alternative, ‘coalitions of the willing’,
(Haass 1997) has a mixed record in Iraq is no consolation. The osce,
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once committed to promoting democracy ‘from Vancouver to Vladivos-
tok’, faces the prospect of undemocratic Kazakhstan as its chair in 2010
(Walker 2007).³⁸
New proposals to solve old and new problems will emerge and evolve,
of course. Global stewardship, such as Billanthropy and environmental
initiatives, may be one such pattern. The world’s wealthiest individuals
are privately funding new approaches to political and economic develop-
ment, education, poverty, health care, environmentalism, and the provi-
sion of other public goods. George Soros, Ted Turner, Bill Gates, Warren
Buﬀet, Carlos Slim, Mo Ibrahim and others are able to go around the
usual organizations, or leverage them, in innovative ways where interna-
tional eﬀorts have struggled. Even if personal fortunes are lacking, indi-
viduals like Princess Diana, James E. Carter, Bill Clinton, Al Gore and
Bono can mobilize public awareness (and attract funding) for their own
global initiatives. Meanwhile, non-profit, commercial and state-led envi-
ronmental initiatives may oﬀer not only new technologies but also new
forms of collaboration as policy makers, activists, scientists and entre-
preneurs each seek to advance their versions of global stewardship. Al
Gore’s book, An Inconvenient Truth, was a New York Times bestseller; the
film version won the 2007 Academy Awards for best documentary fea-
ture. Whether these or other approaches can improve or replace the roles
of states or international organizations will prove to be an important area
of analysis.
Petropolitics
Global energy politics has numerous military, political, economic and
environmental aspects. Even if there were a ‘reverse oil shock’ (Romero
2008) it would likely be temporary. The world’s energy needs, particu-
larly of large and developing China and India, will continue to increase,
and much of this increased demand will be for oil. The global supply of
oil is under pressure in the short term because its primary sources are
subject to terrorism, war and political instability, and in the long term
because soon (if not already) the world will pass its maximum produc-
tion possibility (‘peak oil’, Hubbert 1956) and work from there toward
depletion. A new boom is underway in the search for renewable and al-
ternative energy technologies, but no magic formulas are imminent.
Beyond geologic and geopolitical issues, additional problems exist.
Countries positioned to benefit from natural endowments of oil and
other energy resources frequently encounter acute political and eco-
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nomic diﬃculties instead (Gelb 1988; Auty 2001; Ross 2001). Thomas
Friedman (2006) asserted an inverse relationship between freedom and
the price of oil. According to the Failed States Index (Foreign Policy 2005)
nearly two-thirds of the world’s proven natural gas reserves and nearly
three-quarters of the world’s proven oil reserves were in states that were
judged ‘borderline’, ‘in danger’, or ‘critical’. Additionally, environmental
concerns and environmental activists have increased pressure on gov-
ernments, corporations and individuals to wean themselves from carbon
fuels. The science and politics of energy – carbon and alternative – will
continue to prove fertile and dynamic areas of inquiry.
us and Globalization
Study of the United States on its own merits and as a force in world af-
fairs will remain vibrant and important. Whatever its shortcomings, for
most of the past half century the United States has been a strong, lib-
eral and mostly benevolent empire. Harold Innis (1948) called American
imperialism ‘plausible and attractive’. John F. Kennedy (1961) challenged
other nations to ‘ask not what America will do for you, but what to-
gether we can do for the freedom of man.’ Post-Cold War American em-
pire became a bipartisan blend of realism and idealism – ‘the indispens-
able nation’ (Clinton 1996).³⁹ But this occurred while the world became
‘normal’ again (Kagan 2007). The United States has citizens and allies
weary from Iraq, emerging competitors in Russia, China and elsewhere,
a combination of domestic forces opposing immigration and war, re-
duced credibility in global opinion polls, and mutual suspicion between
it and a wide range of important global actors. If there is a ‘new Bretton
Woods’, both the prominence and the philosophical approaches of the
new us presidential administration will be important to note.
Paraphrasing the quintessential American writer, Mark Twain, reports
of the death of globalization may be greatly exaggerated. One might see
conditions that contributed toWorldWar I (Ferguson 2004), a ‘new Cold
War’, China surpassing theWest, or a new kind of global conflict. But one
scenario is that the United States could devolve into a great power that es-
chews leadership in most non-vital global issues and areas – a hegemon
unable or unwilling to provide global public goods, becoming instead
mercantilist, predatory, unpredictable, a declining empire, or some com-
bination (Mann 2003; Wallerstein 2003; Ferguson 2004; Johnson 2004;
2006; Hoﬀman 2004; Bacevich 2005a). Many, in the us and elsewhere,
may initially welcome this retreat to a humbled American isolationism.
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But in combination with energy conflicts and ineﬀective international
organizations, the long, wide trends toward freer and more integrated
markets, peoples and ideas may be threatened. Academia, private sector
resources, policy makers and their publics must work vigilantly to note
and understand these and other developments if they seek to advance
not only their strategic interest but also the human condition.
Notes
1 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became the Or-
ganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with the Charter of
Paris for a New Europe in 1990. See www.osce.org.
2 The bbc web site has a thorough introduction to the eu constitution
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm, much of the discussion
here relies on it. uk polling data from icm, mori and others is collected
at www.ukpollingreport.co.uk.
3 On the international and domestic sources of public dissatisfaction with
the eu and its constitution, see, for example, Cohen-Tanugi (2005) and
Kramer (2006).
4 See, for example, the survey by the Eurobarometer at http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/flash/fl_245_full_en.pdf for an analysis of voters and non-
voters in the days immediately following the referendum.
5 Of related interest is the analysis of the increasing diﬃculty of admission
to the wto, by Jones (2006).
6 See, for example, Jones (2006).
7 Compare with Williamson’s (2002) defense of the Washington Consensus
and his criticism of it being labeled ‘neo-liberal’.
8 A recent New York Times column on China in Chad, for example, is by
French and Polgreen 2007.
9 Reuters, imf urges coordinated eu approach to crisis, October 4, 2008.
Http://www.reuters.com/article/usDollarRpt/idusl470304920081004.
10 Possibly the first to use this was Libertarian Party us presidential can-
didate Bob Barr, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/
opinion/2008/10/09/do0901.xml.
11 Targeting your 401(k).Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2008.
12 Agence France-Presse, Iran hails world financial crisis as ‘end of capital-
ism’. October 15, 2008. Http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=
081015152055.72llwkbo.
13 Reuters, Chavez says ‘Comrade Bush’ turns left in crisis. October 15, 2008.
Http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=ustre49f0k720081016.
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14 Notably, Germany’s energy relationship with Russia stood out from other
European countries. Germany and Russia agreed to a special pipeline
route, Nord Stream, toward the end of chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s
term; Schroeder took position at Gazprom shortly thereafter (Kramer
2007). In 2008, German energy company E.On completed a deal with
Gazprom to acquire a stake in a major Siberian natural gas field, on terms
said to be friendly to E.On (see, for example, Chazan and Esterl 2008).
15 us Department of State. 2008. Background Note: Iran. Http://www.state
.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm.
16 See, for example, imf (2007) and Economist Country Briefings: Iran
(http://www.economist.com/countries/Iran); compare with Campbell (2007).
17 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei oﬀered such a scenario in September 2008 (Agence
France-Presse, Iran boasts its forces can control the Gulf, http://
www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=080916143106.poyzy127&show
_article=1).
18 us Department of State, Background Note: Venezuela. June 2008. Http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm.
19 Reuters, Oil powerhouse Venezuela struggles to keep lights on. October
22, 2008. Http://www.reuters.com/article/gca-Oil/
idustre49m0bw20081023.
20 Worldwide, firms owned and/or controlled by the state are the largest
companies in the emerging markets. Of the top 100 companies in the
world, by market capitalization, nine are from Russia, China or Brazil.
Mexico is the only other emerging market with a company in the top
200. Of these nine, six are energy companies (including Gazprom, third
largest company in the world by market capitalization), and five are Chi-
nese (two energy, two financial, one telecom). Of the top 200 companies
worldwide, 16 are emerging market firms, and only two of those are not
state controlled. (Emerging into a world of giants, Financial Times,August
22, 2006.)
21 Examples are oﬀered by Talbott (1997); Bosnia from p. 79 therein.
22 PollingReport.com,Newsweek/Princeton Survey Research Associates. Oc-
tober 10–11, 2001. Http://www.pollingreport.com/terror8.htm.
23 Bacevich (2005b) and Johnson (2004) examine this new militarism from
a broader perspective and longer time horizon.
24 Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001.
25 State of the Union, January 20, 2002.
26 National Security Strategy. September 17, 2002. Http://www.whitehouse
.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html.
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27 Authors included Paul Wolfowitz (Donald Rumsfeld’s deputy secretary of
defense), and I. Lewis Libby (chief of staﬀ to vice president Richard Ch-
eney). For the original reporting, see Tyler 1992a; 1992b.
28 2006 National Security Strategy. Http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/
2006/sectionX.html.
29 Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001.
30 The following us data is from PollingReport.com (http://www
.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm).
31 The European data is from ft/Harris polls of uk, France, Germany, Italy
and Spain (October 2006), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/
allnewsbydate.asp?Newsid=1107. Ipsos mori poll of uk (August 2006),
at http://www.times-archive.co.uk/onlinespecials/trends1.pdf.
32 During the 2006 election cycle, the pro-immigrant factions also be-
came more vocal, gaining some support from Democrats on social jus-
tice and anti-discrimination bases and from big-business Republicans on
economic rationales – see, for example, the editorial ‘The Immigration
Dodge’ in Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2006.
33 Quoted by cnn, Bush, Congress clash over ports sale. February 22, 2006.
Http://www.cnn.com/2006/politics/02/21/port.security/.
34 Kelo v. City of New London, ct, Supreme Court of the United States, June
23, 2005.
35 The narrow, eventual loss by presidential hopeful Andres Manuel Lopez-
Obrador inMexico by fall 2006 had slowed this ‘leftward swing’, but Hugo
Chavez’s reelection in Dec. 2006 may keep it alive – see Casteñeda (2005)
and Schamis (2006). On Putin, see, for example, the series of articles by
Aron (2007), Kasparov (2007) and Sestanovich (2007) in the Journal of
Democracy.
36 The axis of diesel, Times, October 18, 2008. Http://www.timesonline.co
.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article4965123.ece.
37 The birth of philanthrocapitalism, Economist, February 23, 2006. Billan-
thropy, Economist, June 29, 2006. For competing perspectives, see Bishop
and Green (2008) and Edwards (2008).
38 Kazakhstan was originally slated to chair osce in 2009.
39 Clinton at the Democratic National Convention, Chicago, August 29,
1996. M. Albright used the term ‘indispensable nation’ upon being nom-
inated as secretary of state, December 5, 1996, and subsequently. On the
bipartisan blend of realism and idealism, see, for example, Krauthammer
(1990/1991), Wolfowitz (1992) and Brzezinski (1997).
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